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GrandstandingThe present work posits that social motives, particularly status seeking in the form of moral grandstand-
ing, are likely at least partially to blame for elevated levels of affective polarization and ideological
extremism in the U.S. In Study 1, results from both undergraduates (N = 981; Mean age = 19.4;
SD = 2.1; 69.7% women) and a cross-section of U.S. adults matched to 2010 census norms (N = 1,063;
Mean age = 48.20, SD = 16.38; 49.8% women) indicated that prestige-motived grandstanding was consis-
tently and robustly related to more extreme ideological views on a variety of issues. In Study 2, results
from a weighted, nationally-representative cross-section of U.S. adults (N = 2,519; Mean age = 47.5,
SD = 17.8; 51.4% women) found that prestige motivated grandstanding was reliably related to both ide-
ological extremism and affective polarization.
 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The American populace is sharply divided over political and
moral issues (Dimock, Doherty, Kiley, & Oates, 2014). Online out-
rage about political phenomena is common (Brady & Crockett,
2019; Crockett, 2017), and there is considerable evidence that pub-
lic discourse has become more ideologically polarized and less civil
over the past several years (Doherty, Kiley, Tyson, & Johnson,
2019). Several possible explanations of both increasingly polarized
beliefs and a decline in civility have been posited, including eco-
nomic trends, the behavior of political or party elites, media con-
sumption, technological influences, and partisan sorting (Brady,
Crockett, & Van Bavel, 2019; McCarty, 2019). However, there is also
growing evidence that individual differences may contribute to
these trends. The present work examines one such individual dif-
ference—moral grandstanding motivation—that may be partially
responsible for some of the divisions in contemporary American
public discourse.1.1. Ideological extremism and affective polarization
According to recent studies, politicians (Banda & Cluverius,
2018), news media (Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017), and average citi-
zens (Johnston, 2018) are divided on a range of sociopolitical
issues. Study of these divides has led to several recent empirical
articles (for reviews, see: Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra,
& Westwood, 2019; Lelkes, 2016), books (e.g., McCarty, 2019),
and even documentaries (e.g., ‘‘Divided States of America,” 2017)
on the rifts between political partisans in the U.S. Although there
is broad consensus that some of these divides in the American pop-
ulace are worsening (for a review, see: Iyengar et al., 2019), the
nature of political and partisan polarization is a controversial topic
in political science (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Druckman &
Levendusky, 2019; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008) and political psychol-
ogy (Blatz & Mercier, 2018; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, &
Judd, 2015). Some research has focused on divisions in the popu-
lace in terms of partisan identity (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008)
and extreme endorsement of ideological views (Brandt, Reyna,
Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014), whereas other work has
focused on issue-based ideological divides (Fiorina & Abrams,
2008) or emotional reactions to outgroup members (Iyengar,
Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). For the present work, we were interested
in studying these divides in terms of ideological extremism and
affective polarization. Given that these terms are often used differ-
ently across different disciplines, we define our use of each below.
2 J.B. Grubbs et al. / Journal of Research in Personality 88 (2020) 1040091.1.1. Ideological extremism
We use the term ideological extremism as it has been understood
in prior psychological literature, namely, the extent to which peo-
ple report extreme political or ideological views at either end of the
political spectrum (Lammers, Koch, Conway, & Brandt, 2017; van
Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). That is, we conceptualized ideological
extremism as the self-reported adoption of extreme political views
in either direction. Relatedly, we will use the term ideological polar-
ization to refer to the process by which an individual becomes
more ideologically extreme. We will therefore think of polarization
as the process that tends to result in ideological extremism. In this
project, we were specifically interested in examining factors that
predict ideological extremism (i.e., self-report of extreme political
or ideological views), as such factors may also be related to the
process of ideological polarization (i.e., the process by which one’s
reported views move to extremes).
For the present work, we considered ideological extremism as a
key outcome variable in our analyses. However, we note ideologi-
cal extremism itself often functions as an important predictor of
symmetric effects in political and moral psychology (Brandt
et al., 2014). Ideological extremists demonstrate overly simplistic
evaluations of political phenomena (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, &
Sloman, 2013; Lammers et al., 2017; van Prooijen, Krouwel, &
Emmer, 2018). Similarly, extremists are also likely to describe their
beliefs as being objectively correct, regardless of the actual evi-
dence for their beliefs (Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno,
2013). These same extremists are also more likely to reject outside
influences on their decision making process (Brandt, Evans, &
Crawford, 2015). Finally, political extremism is likely associated
with troubling outcomes, such as greater intolerance for non-
likeminded others, greater interpersonal conflict, greater incivility
toward ideological others, and greater affective polarization (for
reviews, see: Brandt et al., 2014; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019).
1.1.2. Affective polarization
Voluminous bodies of work in social psychology demonstrate
that people often show strong antipathy toward outgroup mem-
bers and strong preference for ingroup members (for reviews,
see: Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith,
2016; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Robbins & Krueger, 2005).
Similarly, groups often share emotions at the group level, particu-
larly negative emotions in relation to outgroup members (Smith,
Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Researchers have found such antipathy
across political lines as well. Consistent with previous research,
we use the term affective polarization to refer to the phenomenon
of demonstrating extreme positive affect toward members of one’s
preferred political party and extreme negative affect toward mem-
bers of opposing political parties (Iyengar et al., 2019). That is,
affective polarization is best understood as the gap between the
extremity of one’s affect toward the political outgroup and the
extremity of one’s affect toward the one’s political ingroup. Impor-
tantly, affective polarization seems to function at least somewhat
independently of ideological extremity. Even when people might
be ideologically similar to members of another political party,
affective reactions to those partisan others are often quite negative
(Iyengar et al., 2012). People might experience extreme negative
emotions toward political outgroup members independent of
how ideologically different they are from said others (Iyengar
et al., 2019).
There is clear evidence that affective polarization has increased
over the past several decades (Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2015).
This has happened in multiple ways. First, more people have come
to hold negative attitudes about those in the other party. For exam-
ple, over a 50-year time span, the proportion of American adults
who would object to their children marrying a member of the
opposing political party rose from 4 to 5% in 1960 to 33–50% in2010 (Iyengar et al., 2012). Second, individual antipathy toward
ideological others has also apparently risen in recent years
(Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), with partisans themselves demon-
strating stronger negative evaluations of opposing party members.
The present work seeks to describe one factor that may be con-
tributing to this rise in affective polarization: Moral
Grandstanding.
1.2. Status seeking and moral grandstanding
Psychologists have long known that, when likeminded individ-
uals discuss issues together as a group, they often leave such dis-
cussions with more extreme ideological positions than they
entered with individually (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). This pro-
cess of adopting more extreme views is known as group polariza-
tion (Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Mackie, 1986). Similarly, groups may
demonstrate collective emotions together, wherein extreme
antipathy toward outgroup members is higher at the group level
than at the individual level (Smith et al., 2007). Whereas past
research, informed by social identity theory, has often speculated
that conformity within the group is part of the reason for this pro-
cess of polarization, the present work seeks to extend beyond these
associations and examine how individual differences, such as a
desire for status, might predict such divides.
As a hypersocial species, humans are characterized by a number
of fundamental social motives that seem to influence behaviors
and beliefs in a wide variety of domains (Neel, Kenrick, White, &
Neuberg, 2015). One such motive is status seeking (Anderson,
Hildreth, & Howland, 2015), which refers to the innate human
drive to improve one’s rank, station, and relative standing among
others (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). This
drive for status may be seen in a variety of contexts including
the workplace (Loch, Yaziji, & Langen, 2001), social media environ-
ments (Nesi & Prinstein, 2019), and even leisure pursuits (Walasek
& Brown, 2015). This tendency toward status seeking also seems to
manifest in behavior in the context of public discourse (Grubbs,
Warmke, Tosi, James, & Campbell, 2019). Specifically, some people
seem particularly prone to use moral talk (i.e., public discussions
invoking moral rights, moral principles, moral ideals, and moral
practices) as a means to attain higher status or standing in others’
eyes. In both philosophical work (Tosi & Warmke, 2016, 2020) and
empirical inquiry (Grubbs et al., 2019), this use of moral talk to
seek status is known as Moral Grandstanding (hereafter: MG).
First defined in the philosophical literature (Tosi & Warmke,
2016), MG refers to the use of speech (broadly construed) about
morality, politics, or other important topics to improve relative sta-
tion or rank. People share their values, morals, or political beliefs in
a variety of contexts for a variety of reasons. Sometimes these
motivations are altruistic—they aim to help others (e.g., seeking
to improve the quality of a conversation by providing an insight
or new information; seeking to ameliorate suffering by defending
an underdog). Motivations for engaging in public moral discourse
may also be principled—some people simply aim to do what is
right (e.g., seeking to stand up for what one takes as the right moral
principles; seeking to do one’s duty by telling the truth). However,
some instances of moral talk are likely motivated by a strong desire
to impress others, either by (1) demonstrating one’s impressive
moral qualities to one’s in-group or by (2) attacking ideological riv-
als or opposites for allegedly inferior moral or political views. Prior
psychological work has validated this notion of MG and found that
the motivation to engage in MG is expressed in ways consistent
with either a desire for prestige or a desire for dominance
(Grubbs et al., 2019).
One way humans seek status is by trying to gain prestige, a kind
of social status associated with being seen as knowledgeable,
skilled, or impressive in some way (Cheng et al., 2013). Consistent
J.B. Grubbs et al. / Journal of Research in Personality 88 (2020) 104009 3with this conceptualization of status-seeking more broadly, one
type of MG seems to be characterized by a desire for respect or
admiration from others (e.g., ‘‘My beliefs should be inspiring to
others”). This form of MG is associated with desires for prestige
more generally and is well-predicted by narcissistic extraversion
(Grubbs et al., 2019).
MG can also be motivated by a desire for status that results in
dominating others. Here, grandstanders shame, hurt, or otherwise
exploit potential rivals or ideological opponents (e.g., ‘‘When I
share my beliefs, I do so in the hope that people different than
me will feel ashamed of their beliefs”). Very much akin to more
general status-striving via dominance (Cheng et al., 2013), this
expression of MG seems to be motivated by a desire to assert one’s
rank or power over another person, or to elevate oneself by putting
others down. This form of MG is particularly associated with more
aggressive tendencies and is very well-predicted by narcissistic
antagonism (Grubbs et al., 2019).
Importantly, preliminary empirical examinations of MG have
shown that it is related to a number of potentially concerning
behaviors and outcomes in public discourse (Grubbs et al., 2019).
For example, MG is related to greater conflict with others over
political and moral issues (both cross-sectionally and over time).
MG is also related to greater engagement in antagonistic social
media behaviors in discussions about politics (e.g., sharing mes-
sages or posts with the sole intent of shaming or embarrassing
the original author of the post). Building on these findings, there
may also be reason to suspect that MG relates to affective polariza-
tion and ideological extremism, as we explore below.
1.3. Moral grandstanding and ideological extremism
Philosophical work on MG predicts that grandstanders tend to
stake out extreme moral and political positions to differentiate
themselves from others in search of attention and praise (Tosi &
Warmke, 2016, 2020). The desire for status associated with MG
likely leads people to express increasingly extreme political and
moral opinions as a means of seeming more virtuous, respectable,
or worthy of admiration than others in their group. MG leads peo-
ple to ‘‘ramp up” their ideological positions (or at least their public
presentations of them) to impress or appear superior to others. As
individuals seek status, they may take progressively more extreme
positions in their respective groups as a means of presenting them-
selves as moral paragons. In short, the motivation to engage in MG
is likely associated with adopting more extreme ideological
positions.
For example, consider a discussion between likeminded indi-
viduals, each of whom thinks of herself as caring deeply for the
poor. If someone says that justice demands a $15 per hour mini-
mum wage, another can simply respond that it would be even
more just to institute a $20 per hour minimum wage. In a
grandstanding-rich environment, the others in the group now
must either accept that this person seems to care more for the poor
or adjust their own stated views to keep up. If enough others in the
group accept the ramped-up claim, those with doubts or concerns
risk being left behind or called out as naysayers. Consistent with
previously referenced literature on group polarization and social
conformity (e.g., Mackie, 1986), many people find it more palatable
to subtly calibrate their views according to their in-group’s plat-
form than to risk apostate status. In short, MG might lead to
extremism about any given issue.
A similar dynamic can play out among a likeminded group in
response to the views of an out-group. Ramping up can occur when
group members engage in a competition to see who despises the
out-group the most, with the winner holding the strongest con-
trary view, and thus, the moral high ground. Meanwhile, the
inverse of this competition could happen among the other groupas well. This ramping up effect may happen not only with respect
to one’s ideological views, but also with one’s affective reactions to
the other side, such that individuals in each group coming to hate
the other side more. MG may therefore not only cause ideological
extremism but also affective polarization.
As public discourse comes to resemble a moral arms race, both
affective polarization and ideological polarization (i.e., increasing
amounts of ideological extremism) are predictable consequences.
As such, we might expect to find that MG is linked to more ideolog-
ical extremism and affective polarization, particularly among those
who are seeking prestige or respect from likeminded others.
Consistent with these philosophical insights, preliminary evi-
dence suggests that MG is associated with more extreme political
views. MG motivations—particularly in the domain of prestige—
are associated with ideological extremism, demonstrating a curvi-
linear relationship with single-item ratings of political ideology
(Grubbs et al., 2019). In these preliminary samples of college stu-
dents and weighted nationally-representative cross-sections in
the U.S., individuals who identified as being more extreme in their
political views (i.e., more to the ‘‘left” or the ‘‘right” on a sliding
scale rating of political ideology) also reported a greater desire to
use moral talk as a means of appearing respectable, admirable, or
inspirational to others. However, to date, no work has systemati-
cally examined the nature of these links beyond simple correla-
tional analyses or determined whether these links persist in
measurement environments more rigorous than single-item ideol-
ogy scales. The present work seeks to address these areas of deficit.
1.4. The present work
Building on the literature reviewed above, the present work
examines the relationships between MG and both ideological
extremism and affective polarization in the general public, specif-
ically testing whether MG predicts greater levels of both. In Study
1, we focused solely on ideological extremism using novel mea-
sures of self-identified political orientation in general and in rela-
tion to specific issue/positions. That is, we examined ideological
extremism as the gap between participants self-report of them-
selves being conservative/traditional or liberal/progressive in gen-
eral and in relation to specific policy domains. In Study 2, we
examined both general ideological extremism using traditional
measures of ideological extremity and affective polarization using
widely accepted measures of gaps in partisan affect.
Given that prestige-motivated aspects of MG are closely related
to a desire to appear morally impressive to likeminded others, it
seems likely that individuals who report greater prestige-
motivated MG would also report more extreme views within their
own partisan groups. Similar to more seminal works in social psy-
chology around optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 2011;
Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010), the basic thought is that peo-
ple who are strongly inclined to use moral discourse to impress
others will also be inclined to adopt more extreme ideological posi-
tions because these views help them ‘‘stand out” among the crowd.
Though such views are seen as extreme by outsiders, they may be
seen as more respectable or admirable within their group. Essen-
tially, it seems that these individuals will take extreme positions
in order to garner status and esteem among ideological peers.
Therefore, we expected to find that prestige-motivated MG would
be associated with greater levels of ideological extremism.
In contrast with the desire for respect and esteem associated
with prestige seeking, dominance-motivated aspects of MG convey
a desire to assert one’s rank or power over another by causing
others shame or feelings of inferiority. These tendencies are inher-
ently related to antipathy toward ideological opponents. As such,
we might expect to find that dominance-motivated aspects of
MG are related to more extreme affective reactions toward
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inclined to use moral discourse to dominate and humiliate others
will be also more inclined to feel and express extreme emotional
responses, since these emotional responses can effectively intimi-
date and instill fear.
Although there is very little prior work suggesting that narcis-
sism might be related to ideological extremism, some recent find-
ings have demonstrated that narcissistic antagonism and
narcissistic extraversion are very strongly related to MG motiva-
tions and that narcissistic antagonism often predicts conflict with
others over political and moral issues (Grubbs et al., 2019). Given
these associations, we included narcissistic antagonism and narcis-
sistic extraversion as covariates in our analyses, allowing us to
address the possibility that links between MG and polarization
might be related to the status-oriented personality traits underly-
ing MG rather than MG alone.
Finally, we note that the present work is a secondary analysis of
previously collected data that were partially described in a prior
publication (Grubbs et al., 2019). Specifically, this earlier work
reported associations between basic personality traits and MG,
with a focus on validating the construct and measurement of
MG. However, several of the datasets on which the prior work
reported also included measures of polarization and ideological
extremism that were not included in the earlier publication.
Although our analytic plan was theoretically driven by the above
ideas, this work was not pre-registered, and we do not believe that
our results should be interpreted as confirmation of a prespecified
hypothesis.
More details regarding this entire project, including analytic
code and data, are available via the Open Science Framework at
https://osf.io/3mpx2/.2. Study 1
To initially test the above ideas and examine the links between
MG and polarization, we collected two samples, as detailed below.1 Given the novelty of this approach, we tested the general validity of responses by
examining how participants in each sample differed on raw ratings in each domain.
Specifically, we compared self-identified Democrats and self-identified Republicans
within each sample on each of the items described above. For all domains, self-
identified Democrats scored substantially higher than self-identified Republicans for
ratings of Liberal and Progressive and substantially lower than self-identified
Republicans for ratings of Conservative and Traditional. These analyses are available
via the OSF page for this project at https://osf.io/jgecm/ and https://osf.io/85mec/.2.1. Participants
Participants for Sample 1 were undergraduates at a large, public
university in the Midwest. Participants (N = 981; Mage = 19.4;
SD = 2.1; 69.7% women) were recruited from undergraduate psy-
chology classes throughout the university over the course of four
semesters (Fall 2017, Spring, 2018, Fall 2018, and Spring 2019).
Sample size was determined by maximizing participation over four
semesters, rather than by a priori power analyses. Participants
were able to select the racial or ethnic category that they felt best
applied to themselves (including multiple categories); as such,
totals reported below may exceed 100%. Participants primarily
identified as White (84%), followed by African-American/Black
(12.9%), Latino/a/Hispanic (3.6%), Asian/South-Asian/Pacific-Islan
der (2.1%), American Indian/Native-American (1.0%), and other
(1.5%). Political affiliations reported by participants were as fol-
lows: Democrat (31%), Republican (26.4%), no party affiliation
(27.1%); Libertarian (5.0%), Green (0.8%), Independent (8.6%), and
other (1.1%).
Participants for Sample 2 were internet-using adults in the Uni-
ted States recruited by the Turkprime data-acquisition platform
(now known as Cloud Research; Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock,
2017). Participants (N = 1063; Mage = 48.20, SD = 16.38; 49.8%
women) were recruited in the Summer of 2018 based on U.S.
demographic norms as of the 2010 census for Race, Ethnicity,
Income, Census Region, Age, and Gender. Sample size was deter-
mined by funding limits, rather than by a priori power analyses.
More simply, budgetary constraints led us to recruit a target of1000 participants. Although participants were recruited based on
U.S. nationally representative norms, participants were able to
select the racial or ethnic category that they felt best applied to
themselves (including multiple categories); as such, totals reported
below may exceed 100%. Participants were primarily White
(73.8%), followed by African-American/Black (11.4%), Asian-
Pacific Islander (8.4%), Latino/a/Hispanic (7.1%), American-Indian
/Native-American (3.2%), and other (1.6%). Participants primarily
identified as Democrat (35.7%), followed by Republican (28.9%),
Independent (21.4%), no party affiliation (11.2%), Libertarian
(1.8%), and Other (1.1%).
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Moral grandstanding
We included the Moral Grandstanding Motivations Scale
(Grubbs et al., 2019). This 10-item measure requires participants
to respond on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree)
to items on two subscales. The first, six-item subscale assesses
the extent to which participants are motivated to use moral talk
to seek prestige or respect (e.g., ‘‘My beliefs should be inspiring
to others” and ‘‘I hope that my beliefs cause other people to want
to share those beliefs”). The resulting subscale score is titled Pres-
tige Strivings. The second, four-item subscale assesses the extent to
which participants are motivated to use moral talk to dominate or
shame others (e.g., ‘‘When I share my beliefs, I do so to show peo-
ple who disagree with me that I am better than them”). The result-
ing subscale score is titled Dominance Strivings.
2.2.2. Ideological extremism
For these samples, we assessed ideological extremism via a
novel measure of absolute ideological gap. That is, we measured
the absolute magnitude of the gap between participants’ self-
reported endorsement of Conservative/Traditional ideology and
Liberal/Progressive ideology, so that a greater gap value repre-
sented more polarized views of various political domains.
Political views were assessed in five domains: overall political
views (prompt: ‘‘To what extent do the following items describe
your political views?”), fiscal views (prompt: ‘‘To what extent are
your fiscal (money, budget, tax, and finance) views politically:”),
social views (prompt: ‘‘To what extent are your social (welfare,
entitlements, social-security, and education) views politically:”),
moral views (prompt: ‘‘To what extent are your moral (marriage,
sexuality, abortion/reproductive-rights) views politically:”), and
foreign-policy views (prompt: ‘‘To what extent are your foreign
policy views (military and war; U.S. involvement overseas; U.S.
involvement in nation building) politically:”).
For each of the above categories, we asked participants to rate
the extent to which their political views were ‘‘Conservative,” ‘‘Lib-
eral,” ‘‘Progressive,” or ‘‘Traditional” on a seven-point scale of 0
(Not at all) to 6 (Extremely). That is, we asked participants to
respond to all four descriptors (‘‘Conservative,” ‘‘Liberal,” ‘‘Progres-
sive,” and ‘‘Traditional”) for all five domains.1
We calculated our index of ideological extremism using the fol-
lowing formula:
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðMean Conservativeþ Traditionalð Þ MeanðLiberalþ ProgressiveÞÞ2
q
J.B. Grubbs et al. / Journal of Research in Personality 88 (2020) 104009 5Within each domain, we averaged participant ratings of Conser-
vative and Traditional responses options, then subtracted from this
value the average participant ratings for Progressive and Liberal
response options. This process created an index with a possible
range of 6 to +6, wherein a more liberal ideological gap was rep-
resented by lower values and a more conservative ideological gap
was represented by more positive values. We then squared these
indices and took the square root of the resulting values to create
a series of indicators of unidirectional ideological extremism so
that more extreme values (i.e., values closer to |6|) were indicative
of higher ideological gap and less extreme values (i.e., values closer
to zero) were indicative of lower ideological gap. In sum, this cre-
ated an index of absolute extremism in each domain, regardless of
direction.
2.2.3. Narcissism
Given the robust associations between narcissistic traits and
MG in prior works, we included the Five Factor Narcissism Inven-
tory Short Form in our analyses as a covariate (Sherman et al.,
2015). The FFNI-SF measures numerous domains of narcissistic
personality along several facets. We focused on two composite
indices that have previously shown robust associations with MG:
Narcissistic Antagonism (exploitative, aggressive, and entitled
aspects of narcissism that are strongly associated with MG: Dom-
inance Strivings) and Narcissistic Extraversion (grandiose and
self-important aspects of narcissism that are strongly associated
with MG: Prestige Strivings).
2.3. Analytic plan
In both samples, we computed full descriptive statistics, analy-
sis of internal consistency (Cronbach’s a and McDonald’s x), and
simple product-moment correlations between all key variables.
These variables are all reported in Table 1.
Subsequent to these analyses, we conducted a Structural Equa-
tion Model (SEM) in each sample using the lavaan package
(Rosseel, 2012) for R Statistical Software (R Core Team, 2018). All
analyses were conducted using maximum likelihood estimation
with robust (Huber-White) standard errors and a scaled test statis-
tic. In these analyses, for each sample, we defined the latent vari-
ables MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance by the items of the
corresponding subscales of the MGMS. We also defined the latent
variable Ideological extremism by the five absolute indices of parti-
san ideological gap (Overall, Fiscal, Social, Moral, and Foreign Pol-
icy) described above. In the full SEM, MG: Prestige and MG:
Dominance were regressed on observed exogenous variables FFNI:
Antagonism and FFNI: Extraversion. In turn, Ideological extremism
was regressed on MG: Prestige, MG: Dominance, FFNI: Antagonism,
and FFNI: Extraversion. MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance were
allowed to covary. Similarly, FFNI: Antagonism and FFNI: Extraver-
sion were allowed to covary. This model is summarized in Fig. 1.2 We also conducted these analyses without a latent ideological extremism variable
(i.e., with just observed gap indices) and another model without narcissism as a
covariate. These results are available via the Open Science Framework at https://osf.
io/68wy9/ as Supplemental Fig. 1 and Supplemental Table 4. Of note, patterns of
association for MG: Prestige remained highly similar across all alternate analyses,
though MG: Dominance demonstrated significant negative associations with ideolog-
ical extremism in models where narcissism was not included.3. Study 1 Results
In both samples, Pearson correlations revealed small to moder-
ate associations between MG motivations and ideological extrem-
ism across all indicators (See Tables 1 and 2). In Sample 1, for MG:
Prestige these associations were most often positive and moderate
in size (i.e., r > 0.2; Funder & Ozer, 2019). In contrast, associations
for MG Dominance and ideological gaps were consistently small
and negative. In Sample 2, a similar pattern was observed, with
small positive associations (i.e., r < 0.1; Funder & Ozer, 2019) being
observed between MG Prestige and polarization measures, and
small negative associations between MG Dominance and polariza-
tion measures. In both samples, narcissistic antagonism was nega-tively associated with polarization measures. Finally, in both
samples, the intercorrelations of the various polarization indices
were large and positive (i.e., r = 0.653–0.821).
With regard to our planned SEM analyses: Our specified models
demonstrated good fit in both samples (Robust Fit Indices; Sample
1:v2[111] = 297.99, CFI = 0.975, TLI = 0.969, RMSEA = 0.041,
SRMR = 0.044; Sample 2: v2[111] = 311.78, CFI = 0.977,
TLI = 971, RMSEA = 0.046, SRMR = 0.035).2 In both samples, FFNI
Antagonism was unrelated to MG: Prestige. Similarly, in both sam-
ples, FFNI Antagonism demonstrated strong positive associations
with MG: Dominance, and FFNI Extraversion demonstrated strong
positive associations with MG: Prestige. In turn, MG: Prestige demon-
strated robust associations with Ideological extremism, whereas the
relationship between MG: Dominance and Ideological extremism did
not reach statistical significance. Moreover, in both samples, the
total variance accounted for in Ideological extremism was similar
(Sample 1, R2 = 0.110; Sample 2, R2 = 0.112).
We also considered an alternative interpretation of our data in
which extremism may be understood as predicting MG. That is, we
tested alternatives to our structural model (where MG predicts
extremism) rather than assuming that ours is the most plausible
interpretation of our data. To accomplish this, in both samples,
we compared the above described model to an alternative model
in which MG: Dominance and MG: Prestige were regressed on Ideo-
logical extremism (i.e., where Ideological extremism predicted MG:
Dominance and MG: Prestige) rather than the converse. However,
such a model demonstrated a noticeably inferior fit in both sam-
ples (Sample 1, alternative model fit: v2[113] = 333.87,
CFI = 0.971, TLI = 0.965, RMSEA = 0.048, SRMR = 0.059; v2dif
[2] = 40.316, p < .001; Sample 2, alternative model fit:
v2[113] = 343.41, CFI = 0.973, TLI = 0.968, RMSEA = 0.048,
SRMR = 0.060; v2dif [2] = 35.267, p < .001). That is, our theoretically
expected models (See Fig. 1), are more consistent with the data
obtained than an alternative model wherein polarization may be
seen as predicting grandstanding.3.1. Study 1 Discussion
Results of our first study demonstrated that, in two large sam-
ples, greater motivation to engage in moral grandstanding for
prestige-based reasons was consistently related to greater ideolog-
ical extremism. This finding persisted even when narcissistic traits
were held constant statistically, suggesting that prestige motivated
MG is uniquely related to extremism, beyond its links to narcis-
sism. Moreover, consistent with our predictions, our specified
model (where MG predicted extremism) demonstrated better fit
than an alternative model where extremism predicted MG. Of note,
we found consistently negative links between dominance moti-
vated MG and extremism when narcissistic antagonism was not
included, and insignificant links between dominance and extrem-
ism when narcissism was included. These findings were contrary
to our initial hypotheses and suggest that, to the extent MG: Dom-
inance is related to ideological extremism, it is likely a function of
the close relationship between narcissistic antagonism and
dominance.
Despite our findings regarding prestige motivated MG, these
results demonstrated only preliminary links between MG and
partisan divides, for many reasons. For example, these results did
Table 1
Study 1, Sample 1: Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Correlations.
MG
Prestige
MG
Dominance
Narc.
Antagonism
Narc.
Extraversion
Fiscal
Gap
Social
Gap
Moral
Gap
Foreign
Gap
Overall
Gap
Sample 1
(N = 981)
MG Prestige M = 4.20
SD = 1.11
a = 0.815
x = 0.818
MG
Dominance
M = 2.24
SD = 1.28
a = 0.876
x = 0.880
0.114**
Narc.
Antagonism
M = 2.33
SD = 0.59
a = 0.835
x = 0.845
0.054 0.510**
Narc.
Extraversion
M = 3.33
SD = 0.62
a = 0.640
x = 0.657
0.276** 0.071* 0.323**
Fiscal Gap M = 1.65
SD = 1.70
0.215** 0.076* 0.120** 0.071*
Social Gap M = 1.92
SD = 1.92
0.216** 0.111** 0.172** 0.057 0.759**
Moral Gap M = 2.39
SD = 2.16
0.200** 0.141** 0.175** 0.036 0.653** 0.752**
Foreign Gap M = 1.75
SD = 1.89
0.196** 0.078* 0.137** 0.027 0.762** 0.762** 0.685**
Overall Gap M = 1.89
SD = 1.77
0.209** 0.084** 0.172** 0.010 0.774** 0.821** 0.775** 0.769**
a = Cronbach’s Alpha; x = McDonald’s Omega.
MG = Moral Grandstanding; Narc = Narcissism.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Fig. 1. Structural Equation Models for Study 1, Samples 1 and 2, Demonstrating the Effect of Moral Grandstanding on Ideological Extremism. Sample 1 estimates are before
the slash and Sample 2 estimates are after the slash. Directional arrows represent standardized path estimates; Bi-directional arrows represent standardized covariances.
Item loadings for Moral Grandstanding Motivations Scale items are omitted from the diagram for the sake of clarity but available at https://osf.io/q2egp/. FFNI = Five Factor
Narcissism Inventory. MG = Moral Grandstanding. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation;
SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual.
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idiosyncratic measures of ideological extremism, and did not con-
trol for general political interest. Given that political polarization
implies some measure of political and news interest, it is possiblethat a series of questions related to moral and political beliefs may
be indirectly measuring political interest rather than status seeking
via contributions to moral and political discourse. More simply, it
may be that links between MG and political polarization are better
Table 2
Study 1, Sample 2: Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Correlations.
MG
Prestige
MG
Dominance
Narc.
Antagonism
Narc.
Extraversion
Fiscal
Gap
Social
Gap
Moral
Gap
Foreign
Gap
Sample 2 (N = 1063) MG Prestige M = 4.30
SD = 1.25
a = 0.843
x = 0.844
MG Dominance M = 2.41
SD = 1.44
a = 0.912
x = 0.912
0.263**
Narc. Antagonism M = 2.24
SD = 0.63
a = 0.852
x = 0.858
0.142**
0.599**
Narc. Extraversion M = 2.96
SD = 0.72
a = 0.733
x = 0.739
0.389**
0.333**
0.463**
Fiscal Gap M = 2.00
SD = 1.84
0.105**
0.070*
0.126** 0.095**
Social Gap M = 2.19
SD = 1.92
0.129** 0.113** 0.168** 0.112** 0.725**
Moral Gap M = 2.54
SD = 2.07
0.093** 0.179** 0.206** 0.132** 0.653** 0.772**
Foreign Gap M = 1.92
SD = 1.90
0.129** 0.073* 0.141** 0.081** 0.757** 0.760** 0.696**
Overall Gap M = 2.27
SD = 1.85
0.131** 0.073* 0.180** 0.114** 0.743** 0.803** 0.730** 0.747**
a = Cronbach’s Alpha; x = McDonald’s Omega.
MG = Moral Grandstanding; Narc = Narcissism.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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relationship between engaging in MG and adopting more extreme
views. We sought to address these possible limitations in Study 2.4. Study 2
To extend the findings from Study 1 to a weighted, nationally
representative sample, to account for general political interest, to
measure ideological extremism using a more traditional measure,
and to extend our models to affective polarization as well, we col-
lected a cross-sectional sample of the U.S. population, as described
below.4.1. Participants
Participants were adults in the U.S. (N = 2519; Mage = 47.5,
SD = 17.8; 51.4% women) recruited via YouGov polling and
matched to nationally representative (2016 American Community
Survey) norms for age, gender, race, education, and U.S. Census
Region. Participants identified primarily as 38.7% Democrat,
27.2% Republican, 25.4% Independent, 3.6% other, and 5.1% not
sure. Race was reported as follows: 64.1% White, 12.0% Black,
15.7% Hispanic, 3.3% Asian, 0.9% Native American, 2.5% Mixed,
1.5% other, 0.2% Middle Eastern. Responses were weighted using
YouGov’s proprietary weighting formulae (Rivers, 2016).4.2. Measures
Wemeasured moral grandstanding motivations and narcissistic
extraversion/antagonism using the same measures as Study 1.However, we assessed ideological extremism differently than in
Study 1 and also assessed affective polarization as described below.
4.3. Ideological extremism
We asked participants to rate their political beliefs from ‘‘left”
to ‘‘right” on a sliding scale with an anchor of 100 (liberal or pro-
gressive) on the left and +100 (conservative or traditional) on the
right. We then folded this measure, keeping the absolute value of
one’s self-rating, with more extreme values signifying polarization,
regardless of the direction of such polarization. This resulting index
was termed Ideological Extremism: Left-Right Spectrum.
We also included panel data provided by YouGov on the
strength of political ideology. This data was collected prior to the
administration of our study and is a standard part of the political
information maintained by YouGov as a part of all panel-based
research they facilitate. For this item, participants responded to
the item, ‘‘In general, how would you describe your own political
viewpoint?” on a scale of 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative).
For this index of polarization, consistent with prior research
(Brandt et al., 2015; Garrett & Bankert, 2018; Wegener, Downing,
Krosnick, & Petty, 1995), we folded this scale at the midpoint, with
the highest score (2) representing very liberal or very conservative
and the lowest score (0) indicating moderate ideology. In keeping
with prior literature on this topic, the resulting index was titled:
Ideological Extremism: Panel Ideology.
4.4. Affective polarization
We assessed affective polarization via two methods. First, we
used a gap index based on a feeling thermometer wherein partici-
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specific political affiliations on a scale of 0 (very cold or completely
negative) to 100 (very warm or completely positive). Participants
were asked to rate their feelings toward Democrats and Republi-
cans. Consistent with recent works examining gap in partisan
affect (Garrett & Bankert, 2018; Garrett, Long, & Jeong, 2019;
Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), we looked at the gap in feelings
toward each party by subtracting feelings toward Republicans
from feelings toward Democrats. This created a variable on a scale
of 100 to +100. We then squared these results and then took the
square root of these squares so that all answers were on a scale of
0–100. By doing so, we created a linear absolute-value index of
polarization wherein more extreme affective polarization was rep-
resented by higher values and lower levels of affective polarization
were represented by lower values. The resulting variable was
called Affective Polarization: Feeling Thermometer Gap.
Consistent with prior work in political science (i.e., Iyengar
et al., 2012), we also asked participants how they would feel about
a child or other close loved one married a member of certain polit-
ical parties (Republicans and Democrats). Participants rated their
reactions to the following prompt: ‘‘How would you feel if your
child married someone who identified as: ______________ (note:
if you do not have children, you can imagine how you feel if a close
friend or family member married someone who identified as the
following descriptors)” on a scale of 0 (completely negative) to
100 (completely positive). For this variable, we followed a similar
technique as we did above. We created an affective gap index by
subtracting feelings toward Republicans from feelings toward
Democrats, squaring this resulting gap index, then taking the
square root of the squared value to create a single, linear measure
of polarization. The resulting variable was called Affective Polariza-
tion: Child’s Marriage Gap.4.5. Political interest
In addition to the above measures of polarization, we also ana-
lyzed panel data from YouGov regarding participants’ interest in
politics using a standard item from the American National Election
Study (ANES). YouGov maintains participant responses to the stan-
dard prompt: ‘‘Some people seem to follow what’s going on in gov-
ernment and public affairs most of the time, whether there’s an
election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would you
say you followwhat’s going on in government and public affairs. . .”
Responses were recorded on a scale of 1 (Most of the time) to 4
(Hardly at all). For ease of interpretation, we reversed the scoring
of this item so that greater values indicated more interest in poli-
tics. This resulting score was termed Political Interest.4.6. Analytic plan
All analyses were weighted using population weights provided
by YouGov. Analyses for Study 2 were very similar to Study 1. We
conducted Pearson product-moment correlations between all vari-
ables. We followed these correlations with an SEM analyses in
lavaan similar to those reported in Study 1. Specifically, we defined
the latent variables MG Prestige and MG Dominance by the respec-
tive subscale items of the MGMS. These variables were again
regressed on observed variables FFNI Antagonism and FFNI
Extraversion, as well as the observed variable Political Interest. In
turn, Affective Polarization: Feeling Thermometer Gap, Affective
Polarization: Child’s Marriage Gap, Ideological extremism: Left-
Right Spectrum, and Ideological Extremism: Panel Ideology were
all regressed on the aforementioned variables described above.
This model is summarized in Fig. 2.5. Results
Pearson correlations revealed highly similar results to those
found in Study 1 (See Table 3). Specifically, we consistently found
positive associations between computed indices of partisan polar-
ization (both ideological and affective) and MGmotivations, partic-
ularly prestige motivations, though these associations were
typically small to moderate in size (r = 0.1–0.2; Funder & Ozer,
2019). See Table 2.
In our subsequent SEM analysis, we found similar patterns to
those observed in Study 1. The fit of our model was good (Robust
Fit Indices: CFI = 0.977, TLI = 0.966, RMSEA = 0.043, SRMR = 0.038).
These results are summarized in Fig. 2. Specifically, consistent with
Study 1, we saw strong positive associations between FFNI: Antag-
onism and MG: Dominance and between FFNI: Extraversion: and
MG: Prestige. Additionally, analyses demonstrated positive associa-
tions between general political interest and both MG: Dominance
and MG: Prestige.
With regard to our outcome variables, results were generally
consistent with Study 1. General interest in politics was positively
associated with all forms of polarization, as was MG: Prestige. MG:
Dominance was only positively associated with Ideological
Strength and affective polarization in the form of feelings about
children’s marriages. Both FFNI Antagonism and FFNI Extraversion
demonstrated sporadic relationships with polarization, either
being negatively related to polarization or not significantly related
at all. Variance accounted for in each outcome variable by our
model ranged from R2 = 0.092 for ideological identification to
R2 = 0.240 for affective polarization as indicated by feeling ther-
mometer responses.
Consistent with Study 1, we also tested alternative SEMs and
compared them to our preferred model reported above. The first
alternative model we tested followed a similar pattern to alterna-
tive models in Study 1, wherein MG variables were treated as out-
comes predicted by all other variables. In this alternative model,
MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance were regressed on observed
polarization and extremism indices. This model demonstrated
much worse fit than the above reported model (Robust Fit Indices:
CFI = 0.768, TLI = 0.671, RMSEA = 0.105, SRMR = 0.096;
v2dif[6] = 2089.3, p < .001). Additionally, we specified another alter-
native model wherein we defined a latent variable, General Polar-
ization using all observed polarization indices as indicators. This
model also demonstrated worse fit than the above described model
wherein each observed polarization index was treated as an inde-
pendent outcome (Robust Fit Indices: CFI = 0.953, TLI = 0.941,
RMSEA = 0.057, SRMR = 0.045; v2dif[17] = 318.6, p < .001). Finally,
we specified an alternative model where Ideological Extremism:
Panel Ideology was included as an exogenous covariate in the
model, predicting both MG: Prestige and MG: Dominance, as well
as the remaining three measures (Ideological Extremism: Left/
Right Spectrum; Affective Polarization: Feeling Thermometer;
and Affective Polarization: Child’s Marriage Gap). In testing this
model, we found adequate fit (CFI = 0.975, TLI = 0.963,
RMSEA = 0.045, SRMR = 0.040), but again found that our
original model demonstrated better fit by a significant margin
(v2dif [2] = 15.383, p < .001).5.1. General discussion
Past work in philosophy has argued that MG has a polarizing
effect in public discourse. We evaluated this possibility in three
samples, examining both ideological extremism and affective
polarization. Below we summarize our findings and discuss the
implications of the present work.
Fig. 2. Structural Equation Model in Study 2 Predicting Polarization and Extremism Indicators. Directional arrows represent standardized path estimates; Bi-directional
arrows represent standardized covariances. Item loadings for Moral Grandstanding Motivations Scale items are omitted from the diagram for the sake of clarity but available
at https://osf.io/q2egp/. FFNI = Five Factor Narcissism Inventory. MG = Moral Grandstanding. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. Robust Fit Indices: CFI = 0.977, TLI = 0.966, RMSEA = 0.043, SRMR = 0.038.
Table 3
Study 2: Descriptive Statistics, Internal Consistency Coefficients, and Correlations.
M (SD) a x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Moral Grandstanding: Prestige Strivings 4.86 (0.99) 0.767 0.770
2. Moral Grandstanding: Dominance Strivings 2.33 (1.45) 0.908 0.909 0.163**
3. Narc. Antagonism 2.24 (0.70) 0.877 0.881 0.162** 0.663**
4. Narc. Extraversion 2.92 (0.74) 0.741 0.744 0.407** 0.303** 0.568**
5. Ideological Extremism: Panel Ideology 0.95 (0.80) – – 0.126** 0.009 0.079** 0.049*
6. Ideological extremism: Left-Right Spectrum 56.31
(35.49)
– – 0.132** 0.057** 0.149** 0.084** 0.587**
7. Political Interest 3.20 (0.09) – – 0.154** 0.125** 0.206** 0.021 0.262** 0.328** .
8. Affective Polarization: Feeling Thermometer
Gap
44.42
(30.22)
– – 0.121** 0.155** 0.296** 0.150** 0.456** 0.619** 0.415**
9 Affective Polarization: Child’s Marriage Gap 34.14
(31.20)
– – 0.128** 0.064** 0.199** 0.091** 0.445** 0.560** 0.337** 0.775**
a = Cronbach’s Alpha; x = McDonald’s Omega.
MG = Moral Grandstanding; Narc = Narcissism.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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aspects of MG were positively related to affective polarization and
ideological extremism in all ways in which we measured it. This is
consistent with preliminary links between prestige-motivated MG
and single-item measures of ideological extremism (Grubbs et al.,
2019). That is, prestige-motivated MG was a uniformly positive
associate of more extreme political ideology across single-item
ideology measures, affective gap measures, and multi-item ideo-
logical gap measures. These links persisted even when general
political interest and involvement were statistically controlled,
and testing of alternative models suggest that our conceptualized
pathways (i.e., that polarization and extremism are predicted by
prestige-motivated MG) were more consistent with the data than
alternative models (i.e., that polarization or extremism predicts
prestige-motivated MG).
Though we expected that dominance-motivated aspects of MG
would be predictive of affective polarization, we found no supportfor this notion and some support for its opposite. That is, in Study
1, we found negative correlations between MG Dominance and
ideological extremism. Moreover, in Study 2, raw correlations
observed between dominance-motivated MG and affective polar-
ization were reduced to insignificance in latent variable analyses.
In our weighted, nationally-representative sample, dominance-
motivated MG was not significantly related to any of our measures
of affective polarization.
The reasons for the lack of support for our hypotheses regarding
dominance-motivated MG are unclear. In all three samples, the
raw associations between dominance-motivated MG and narcissis-
tic antagonism were quite large (r > 0.5), and the magnitude of
these relationships appeared even larger in latent variable analy-
ses. Additionally, across samples, narcissistic antagonism was most
often negatively related to polarization and political interest. As
such, it is possible that any relationship between dominance-
motivated MG and polarization is overshadowed by the negative
10 J.B. Grubbs et al. / Journal of Research in Personality 88 (2020) 104009links between narcissistic antagonism and such polarization, and
that any residual relationships in structural models are a function
of suppression effects. Alternatively, and perhaps more simply, the
relationship between prestige-motivated MG and polarization may
overshadow any possible connection between dominance-
motivated MG and polarization. This would suggest that simple
correlations between MG Dominance and affective polarization
(as seen in study 2) may be a function of the shared variance
between prestige-motivated MG and dominance-motivated MG
such that dominance-motivated MG is unrelated to polarization
when controlling for prestige-motivated MG.
5.2. Implications and future directions
Links between MG and polarization are not evenly distributed.
Although prior empirical work has conceptualized MG as being
expressed in terms of prestige strivings (i.e., a desire to be
respected, admired, or emulated for one’s moral beliefs) and dom-
inance strivings (i.e., a desire to shame or embarrass those that dis-
agree with one’s moral beliefs), only the former of these categories
is consistently related to affective polarization or more extreme
ideological positions. This point is particularly fascinating given
the established links between prestige strivings and other politi-
cally relevant domains, which we explore below.
Prior works have linked the prestige-motived aspects of MG to
many generally positive outcomes. For example, both cross-
sectionally and over time, prestige-motivated MG is related to
greater civic engagement in the form of voting behavior, volun-
teerism, and philanthropy (Grubbs, Tosi & Warmke, 2020). Simi-
larly, both cross-sectionally and over time, prestige motivated
MG is related to reports of growing closer to others over political
and moral issues (Grubbs et al., 2019). In contrast, dominance-
oriented aspects of MG are associated with a reduced likelihood
of voting and greater reports of conflict and discord over political
issues (Grubbs et al., 2019, 2020). Yet, the present results seem
to run somewhat counter to these previous works by demonstrat-
ing that prestige-motivated MG also seems to be associated with
adverse outcomes for civic life. The present work consistently
shows that more extreme political views, affective reactions to
political views, and partisan ideology are related to prestige-
motivated MG.
What follows from these findings is a more nuanced under-
standing of howMGmight be related to public discourse and polit-
ical polarization more broadly. Specifically, we can consider that
prestige-motivated MG might be associated with putatively posi-
tive outcomes such as greater civic engagement while also indicat-
ing more extreme political views. This is not surprising as more
extreme partisans are more politically active (McCarty, 2019). Sim-
ilarly, although prestige-motivated MGmay predict growing closer
to others over political issues, such relationship-strengthening
does not preclude the possibility of polarization. Prestige-
motivated MG may simply be associated with stronger relation-
ships to polarized others (i.e., polarized people bond with others
over shared extreme views). In short, prestige-motivated MG
may be related to seemingly good things while also facilitating
polarization and extremism, which are known to drive a range of
negative outcomes at societal levels (McCarty, 2019) and in family
relationships (Chen & Rohla, 2018).
Regarding the weaker relationship between dominance-
motivated MG and extremism, we suspect that this is due to inher-
ent differences between dominance and prestige approaches to
status seeking. To achieve status, dominance grandstanders are
less likely to employ a kind of moral one-upmanship than they
are to simply call names or use harsh, condemning language.
Crucially, one needs not shift one’s moral or political views to
assert dominance in this way. Prestige-seeking grandstanders, onthe other hand, often attempt to appear more morally impressive
or enlightened. These judgments are typically comparative (one is
trying to look morally better than others) and contextual (one is
using a particular issue or discursive environment to carry out this
task). Thus, we hypothesize that attempting to enhance appear-
ances by prestige-MG suggests a more adroit mechanism (i.e.,
shifting one’s moral or political views to a more extreme position)
to make oneself morally impressive within a relevant network. In
short, we suspect that built into the very nature of prestige-
striving is a mechanism for ideological polarization which leads
to greater extremism, and that with respect to dominance-
striving, this mechanism is either not present, rarely activated, or
overridden by some other process more efficient for attaining
dominance.
A similar dynamic could be at play concerning affective polar-
ization. One need not take up highly polarized emotions to abuse
others via dominance grandstanding. For those motivated by pres-
tige, however, being seen as especially warm toward or approving
of one’s in-group, and especially cold toward or disapproving of
one’s out-group, could promote one’s status within one’s in-
group. Thus, affective polarization also seems more useful as an
avenue for seeking prestige than it does for seeking dominance.
On the other hand, however, highly polarized emotions would
seem to facilitate dominance grandstanding, too. Hatred and
resentment of partisan others appear to be natural motivations
outlets for status-seeking via dominance behaviors. We admit that
the lack of closeness between affective polarization and dominance
grandstanding is puzzling in light of the apparent similarities.
The present work also may inform future work related to group
polarization more generally as well as intergroup relations.
Although the current work focuses on the role that individual dif-
ferences might play in promoting more extreme ideology and
affective reactions to ideological others, the current results also
suggest that attempts to seek prestige may also influence inter-
group relations. Desires to be seen as inspirational and admirable
for one’s moral views (i.e., prestige-motivated grandstanding) con-
sistently predicted not only more extreme ideological positions but
also more extreme affective responses to others. Accordingly, it
seems that status seeking via prestige within one’s own group
might ultimately predict more volatile and negative evaluations
of members of the outgroup.
6. Limitations
The primary limitations of the present work are obvious. We
relied exclusively on self-report data using cross-sectional samples
in a purely U.S. context. As such, we urge caution before interpret-
ing the present findings as being representative of anything more
than associations between related domains in the American cul-
tural context. Although our sampling methods were rigorous and
representative, future longitudinal work is needed to determine
if prestige-motivated aspects of MG are causing polarization or
driving some parts of polarization. Given the cross-sectional nature
of our work, we acknowledge that another plausible interpretation
of our data is that various aspects of polarization are driving
prestige-motivated MG. However, given our tests of such alterna-
tive models, we contend that this is less likely than our proposed
model positing that prestige-motivated MG leads to polarization.
We also note that ideological extremism is likely to occur with
respect to specific issues, such as the morality of abortion, mini-
mum wage laws, immigration, or tax rates. Although we evaluated
ideological extremism within the context of specific domains in
Study 1 (e.g., fiscal policy), we did not examine specific issues
themselves (e.g., tax law). MG may lead individuals to take up
increasingly extreme views or attitudes on specific issues, particu-
larly those that are deemed especially important to one’s social
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tion of more extreme views on issues that are likely to confer social
status within one’s network. This presents a need for both longitu-
dinal research examining MG and polarization broadly and future
work examining how MG might lead to extremism along specific
moral and political issues over time.
Finally, we note that a number of potentially important covari-
ates were not included in our study. For example, we did not assess
general political knowledge, which could impact our findings as
prior works have shown that political knowledge is often associ-
ated with greater ideological extremism (Bakker, Lelkes, & Malka,
2020; Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Guay & Johnston, 2020;
Zaller, 1992). Similarly, we did not assess general belief superiority
(i.e., the notion that one has better beliefs or ideas than others).
This may be particularly relevant given literature suggesting ideo-
logical extremism is indeed related to belief superiority (Toner
et al., 2013) and prestige motivated MG is characterized by a desire
to be seen as special or admirable for one’s beliefs.
7. Conclusions
Across three samples, involving undergraduate students and
nationally-representative U.S. cross-sections, we found consistent
support for the notion that that moral grandstanding is linked to
ideological extremism and affective polarization. These findings
are particularly clear for prestige-motivated grandstanding, and
less so for dominance motivated grandstanding. Collectively, our
findings point to the importance of considering status seeking as
an associate of polarization—both ideological and affective--and
indicate a need for future research examining whether status seek-
ing predicts increases in polarization over time or in specific issue
domains.
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